Title VII: New Restrictions on the Disparate Impact Prima Facie Case - Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. by Glienke, Roger Carl
DePaul Law Review 
Volume 30 
Issue 4 Summer 1981 Article 8 
Title VII: New Restrictions on the Disparate Impact Prima Facie 
Case - Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Greyhound 
Lines, Inc. 
Roger Carl Glienke 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review 
Recommended Citation 
Roger C. Glienke, Title VII: New Restrictions on the Disparate Impact Prima Facie Case - Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 30 DePaul L. Rev. 945 (1981) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol30/iss4/8 
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, please contact 
digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
TITLE VII: NEW RESTRICTIONS ON THE DISPARATE
IMPACT PRIMA FACIE CASE-
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION V.
GREYHOUND LINES, INC.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' was enacted to provide a remedy
for victims of arbitrary employment discrimination due to race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin, and to prevent the continuation of such prac-
tices.2 Seventeen years after the enactment of Title VII, however, several
issues relating to employment discrimination remain unsettled, 3 and conse-
quently have been the subject of widely differing treatment in the various
United States Circuit Courts of Appeals.
4
In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Greyhound Lines,
Inc.,s the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled that
proportionate representation of a minority in an employer's work force
prevents a finding under Title VII that a facially neutral hiring or promotion
procedure has a disparate impact upon that minority." Additionally, the
court held that to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination under
the disparate impact 7 theory, a Title VII plaintiff must show a causal con-
nection between the challenged policy or practice and a racially unequal
result. 8 In imposing these standards, the Third Circuit has unnecessarily
restricted the disparate impact theory, thereby hampering the effectiveness
of litigation based on the theory as an enforcement mechanism under Title
VII.
BACKGROUND
The enactment of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 resulted from
growing congressional awareness that equality of citizenship in such areas as
voting, education, and access to public accommodations meant little without
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to -17 (1976 & Supp. 1 1977, Supp. 11 1978, Supp. III 1979)
(originally enacted as Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-716, 78 Stat. 259 (1964)).
2. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1963), reprinted in I EEOC, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND IX OF THE CIVIL RIGHITS Acr OF 1964, at 2026 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
3. See, e.g., Lopatka, A 1977 Primer on the Federal Regulation of Employment Discrimti-
nation, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 69 [hereinafter cited as Lopatka]; Shoben, Probing the Discriminatory
Effects of Employee Selection Procedures with Disparate Impact Analysis Under Title VII, 56
TEX. L. REV. 1, 23 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Shoben].
4. See notes 35, 134, and accompanying text infra.
5. 635 F.2d 188 (3d Cir. 1980).
6. Id. at 192-93.
7. The term "disparate impact" is used synonymously by the courts with "disparate effect,"
"discriminatory impact," "discriminatory effect," "disproportionate impact," and "dispropor-
tionate effect." These terms refer to a facially neutral policy or requirement that falls more
heavily upon a group protected by Title VII than another group. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433
U.S. 321, 329 (1977). To avoid confusion, this Note will use only the term "disparate impact."
8. 635 F.2d 188, 193 (3d Cir. 1980).
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a corresponding equality in employment opportunity for individuals.9 Al-
though lack of equality for blacks as a class was, at the time, a major impetus
for the Act's formulation, the focus of Title VII upon individuals, and not
classes, is clear both on the face of the statute ° and in the legislative
history. '
In recognition of Title VII's emphasis on protecting individuals, the
United States Supreme Court has outlined two alternative theories by which
an individual may sue an employer for racial discrimination in employment
under Title VII. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,' 2 the Court en-
9. In reference to Title VII, the House Judiciary Committee Report stated that:
In other titles of the bill we have endeavored to protect the Negro's right to first-
class citizenship. Through voting, education, equal protection of the laws, and free
access to places of public accommodations, means have been fashioned to eliminate
racial discrimination.
The right to vote, however, does not have much meaning on an empty stomach.
The impetus to achieve excellence in education is lacking if gainful employment is
closed to the graduate. The opportunity to enter a restaurant or hotel is a shallow
victory where one's pockets are empty. The principle of equal treatment under law
can have little meaning if in practice its benefits are denied the citizen.
H.R. REP. No. 914 PART 2, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1963), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 2, at 2147.
10. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 200e-2(a) (1976 & Supp. 11 1978)
provides:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or
national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
Id. (emphasis added).
11. Senators Clark and Case, floor managers of the Act, issued an interpretive memorandum
on Title VII which stated that:
It must be emphasized that discrimination is prohibited as to any individual. While
the presence or absence of other members of the same minority group in the work
force may be a relevant factor in determining whether in a given case a decision to
hire or to refuse to hire was based on race, color, etc., it is only one factor, and the
question is [sic] each case would be whether that individual was discriminated
against.
110 CONC. REC. 7213 (1964) (emphasis added), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 2,
at 3040.
12. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Green, a black civil rights activist, engaged in disruptive and illegal
activity against his former employer to protest that his discharge and the firm's hiring practices
were racially motivated. After being refused re-employment, Green sued the corporation,
claiming a violation of Title VII. The Supreme Court affirmed the Eighth Circuit's finding that
Green had presented a prima facie case of discrimination, but remanded since the court of
appeals had erred by holding that the firm's showing that its reason for the refusal to rehire was
based on Green's illegal activity did not discharge its burden of proof in rebuttal. The Court
additionally outlined one method of presenting a prima facie case under the disparate treatment
theory:
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dorsed what has since become known as the disparate treatment approach.
Under this method, the plaintiff must allege13 that the employer treats some
people less favorably than others similarly situated in hiring or promotion
because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Proof of a
discriminatory motive is critical under this analysis.14
An earlier decision, Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,' 5 focused on the conse-
quences of employment practices, not simply the motivation of the em-
ployer,' 6 and established the disparate impact analysis under Title VII. The
Griggs Court interpreted the Act to proscribe not only overt, purposeful
discriminatory actions,' 7 but also practices which are "fair in form, but
This may be done by showing (i) that [plaintiff] belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that
[plaintiff] applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking
applicants; (iii) that, despite [plaintiff's] qualifications, [plaintiff] was rejected; and
(iv) that, after [plaintiff's] rejection, the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.
Id. at 802. Accord, Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 575 (1978).
13. In both disparate treatment and disparate impact cases, plaintiff first bears the burden of
presenting a prima facie case of discrimination. This rule was originated by Justice John
Marshall Harlan in Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1881). Observing that although blacks
constituted one-sixth of the Delaware population, no black had ever served as a juror in that
state, Harlan stated:
The showing ... presented a prima facie case of denial, by the officers charged with
selection of grand and petit jurors, of that equality of protection which has been
secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. It was, we think, under
all the circumstances, a violent presumption which the state court indulged, that the
uniform exclusion of that race from juries, during a period of many years, was solely
because, in the judgment of those officers, fairly exercised, the black race in Dela-
ware were utterly disqualified, by want of intelligence, experience, or moral integ-
rity, to sit on juries.
Id. at 397. If successful in establishing a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the employer
to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for either the discriminatory treatment
or impact. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
14. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977);
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-06 (1973).
15. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
16. Id. at 432. In Griggs, black employees of the power company challenged the employer's
requirement of either a high school diploma or satisfactory performance on a standardized
general intelligence test as a prerequisite to employment or transfer to better jobs. Both require-
ments operated to disqualify blacks at a substantially higher rate than whites, and neither
standard was shown to be significantly related to successful job performance. Id. at 425-26. The
appellate court held for defendant, stating that in the absence of a discriminatory purpose, use of
such requirements was permitted under Title VII. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225,
1235 (4th Cir. 1970). A unanimous Supreme Court reversed, holding that "good intent or
absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms
that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job
capability." 401 U.S. at 432.
17. The Griggs Court interpreted the underlying motivation of Congress in enacting Title
VII to be as follows: "What is required by Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and
unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the
basis of racial or other impermissible classification." Id. at 431.
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discriminatory in operation." 8 If the practice operates to exclude a group
protected by Title VII, and the employer cannot justify the practice in terms
of its relationship to job performance or business necessity, the activity is
prohibited.' 9 When the employer successfully proves job-relatedness, the
plaintiff may then attempt to prove the existence of other selection methods
that lack a similar disparate impact and that would also serve the employer's
interest in obtaining "efficient and trustworthy workmanship." 20  Such a
showing constitutes evidence that the employer used the practice merely as a
pretext for discrimination. 21 Proof of a discriminatory motive is not, how-
ever, required under the disparate impact analysis.2
2
Under either method, a Title VII plaintiff must first establish a prima
facie case of discrimination before the burden shifts to the employer to justify
the discriminatory practice. 23 The elements of the prima facie case, how-
ever, differ under the two theories. The disparate treatment analysis requires
evidence sufficient to create an inference that an employment decision was
based on a discriminatory criterion forbidden by the Act. 24  Under the
disparate impact method, a showing that an employment practice has the
effect of denying members of a race equal access to employment opportuni-
ties is needed. 25  Courts have generally not been overly demanding, how-
ever, in the proof required to establish a prima facie case under either
theory . 26
18. Id. Accord, New York Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 584 (1979); Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324, 335-36 n.15 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975). For a
discussion of employment practices considered to be neutral or "fair in form," see 3 A. LARSON,
EMPLOYMENT DIscRIMINATION § 73.00 (1980) [hereinafter cited as LARSON].
19. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971). Accord, Dothard v. Rawlinson,
433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); Johnson v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364, 1372 n.24 (5th Cir. 1974). The defense of business
necessity was briefed and argued by both parties in Greyhound, but the issue was never reached
by the court of appeals because of its determination that the EEOC had not been successful in
presenting a prima facie case of discrimination. For a discussion of job-relatedness and the
business necessity defense, see generally 3 LARSON, supra note 17, § 78.00; Lopatka, supra note 3,
at 82.
20. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (quoting McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973)). See also Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329
(1977).
21. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804-05 (1973).
22. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 328-29 (1977); International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). See generally B. SCILEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOY-
MENT DISCuMINATION LAW 1-12 (1976); Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke
Power Co. and the Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 Micn. L. REV. 59 (1972).
23. See note 13 supra.
24. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 (1977);
Jackson v. United States Steel Corp., 624 F.2d 436, 440 (3d Cir. 1980).
25. See, e.g., New York Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 584 (1979).
26. E.g., Jackson v. United States Steel Corp., 624 F.2d 436, 440-41 (3d Cir. 1980) (plaintiff
must show he was treated differently from similarly situated individuals of different racial
groups); Whack v. Peabody & Wind Eng'r Co., 595 F.2d 190, 193 n. 11 (3d Cir. 1979) (sufficient
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The Supreme Court has ruled that statistical evidence is appropriate to
make this threshold showing,2 7 and, consequently, three types of statistical
methods have arisen through which Title VII plaintiffs attempt to prove the
prima facie case.2" First, general population pass/fail statistics29 have been
offered to prove that the percentage of blacks in the general population, or
relevant geographical area, potentially excluded by the employer's practice
exceeds substantially the comparable percentage of whites potentially ex-
cluded. 3° Actual applicant pass/fail statistics, 3' comparing the percentage of
actual black applicants who fail a given test or criterion with the percentage
of actual white applicants who fail, have also been used. 32  The third
method of proof, population/work force statistics, 33 compares the percentage
of a minority race in an employer's work force with the percentage of that
to show that plaintiff was a minority worker discharged from job he was qualified for and that
less qualified white workers were retained).
27. E.g., New York Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 584 (1979); Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-33 (1971). See also Note, Disparate Impact and Disparate
Treatment: The Prima Facie Case Under Title VII, 32 ARK. L. REV. 571, 573 (1978); Comment,
Statistics and Title VII Proof: Prima Facie Case and Rebuttal, 15 Hous. L. REV. 1030, 1034
(1978).
28. See Jimerson v. Kisco Co., 542 F.2d 1008, 1010 (8th Cir. 1976); Green v. Missouri Pac.
R.R., 523 F.2d 1290, 1293-94 (8th Cir. 1975). See generally Hay, The Use of Statistics to
Disprove Employment Discrimination, 29 LABOR L.J. 430, 431-34 (1978); Shoben, supra note 3,
at 6-9.
29. The origin of this method of statistical proof is found in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424 (1971). There the Court compared the percentage of white male high school graduates
to black males who had graduated in its determination that an employer's high school diploma
requirement had a disparate impact on blacks. Id. at 430 n.6. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S.
321 (1977), later reaffirmed this method of statistical inference of discrimination by relying on
national statistics showing that the employer's height and weight requirements excluded substan-
tially more females than males from jobs as Alabama prison guards. Id. at 329-30.
30. See, e.g., Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975) (disqualification of
applicants with conviction records); Wallace v. Debron Corp., 494 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1974)
(wage garnishment policy); United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973)
(high school diploma requirement); Gregory v. Litton Sys., Inc., 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972)
(disqualification of applicants with arrest records); Woods v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 420 F. Supp.
35 (E.D. Va. 1976) ("no beard" requirement), afJ'd, 579 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 930 (1979).
31. The origin of this method of statistical proof is also found in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424 (1971). The Court there compared the percentage of whites passing a pre-
employment standardized aptitude test with the percentage of blacks passing it, and concluded
that the test had a discriminatory impact upon blacks. Id. at 430 n. 6.
32. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (aptitude tests); United
States v. Commonwealth of Va., 620 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir. 1980) (height and weight require-
ments, high school diploma, written ability tests); Smith v. Troyan, 520 F.2d 492 (6th Cir. 1975)
(height and weight requirements); Coopersmith v. Roudebush, 517 F.2d 818 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(requirement of recent legal experience and completion of test problem for attorney advisor
position).
33. This method did not originate with the Griggs decision, but was initially accepted by the
lower courts and finally approved by the Supreme Court in International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 n.20 (1977). Accord, Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States,
433 U.S. 299 (1977).
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race in the relevant community or labor pool from which the employer
hires. 34
The use of these three methods by Title VII plaintiffs has led, especially
under the disparate impact analysis, to confusion in the various circuit courts
of appeals on several issues, including what type of statistics may be shown
by a plaintiff to prove a prima facie case; whether discrimination may be
proven without a statistical showing of underrepresentation of a minority in
an employer's work force;3 5 and what type of causal connection between a
challenged policy and a statistically unequal result, if any, must be shown to
prove a prima facie case. In Greyhound, the Third Circuit attempted to
resolve these three issues.
34. See, e.g., EEOC v. Navajo Refining Co., 593 F.2d 988 (10th Cir. 1979) (diploma
requirement and aptitude test); Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 524 F.2d 263 (10th Cir. 1975)
(hiring procedures and assignment of employees); Barnett v. W.T. Grant Co., 518 F.2d 543 (4th
Cir. 1975) (promotion and assignment procedures).
35. A split of authority exists in the courts of appeal concerning this issue. Three circuits hold
that proportionate representation of a minority in an employer's work force will negate a finding
of a discriminatory impact resulting from an employer's practice or requirement on that minor-
ity. See EEOC v. Navajo Refining Co., 593 F.2d 988 (10th Cir. 1979) (statistical disparity
between Spanish-surnamed Americans (SSA's) and Anglos in both pass/fail rates on aptitude tests
and possession of high school diplomas irrelevant when employer's work force contains equal or
larger percentage of SSA's than percentage of SSA's in the surrounding community); Townsend
v. Nassau County Medical Center, 558 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1977) (general population statistics
concerning low percentage of blacks in county with college degrees insufficient to prove dispar-
ate impact of employer's degree requirement when no showing made of actual discrimination in
terms of actual numbers of blacks employed in medical center's work force), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1015 (1978); Jarrell v. Eastern Air Lines, 430 F. Supp. 884 (E.D. Va. 1977) (general
population statistics insufficient to prove disparate impact on females of Eastern's maximum
weight restrictions for flight attendants in light of female dominance in the flight attendant
position), aff'd per curiam, 577 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1978). See note 134 infra.
Four circuits have ruled that proportionate representation of a minority in the work force does
not negate a finding of the discriminatory impact of an employer's policy on that minority. See
Waters v. Furnco Constr. Corp., 551 F.2d 1085 (7th Cir. 1977) (greater percentage of blacks in
the employer's work force than percentage in the community does not prove that employer's
selection procedures are not discriminatory), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 438 U.S. 567
(1978); Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975) (prima facie case can be
established through any of the three statistical methods); Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956
(D.C. Cir. 1975) (that percentage of blacks on police force is comparable to percentage of blacks
in the community does not negate disparate impact of employment test on blacks as shown by
general population or actual applicant statistics; plaintiff need not show both pass/fail and
population/work force statistics to present prima facie case), rev'd on other grounds, 426 U.S.
229 (1976); Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974) (population/
work force statistics showing that Goodyear transferred blacks from labor department and hired
blacks in a ratio equal to the percentage of black population in the area does not negate the
disparate impact of Goodyear's aptitude tests and high school diploma requirement on potential
black hirees or labor department transferees). See also Donnell v. General Motors Corp., 576
F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1978) (general population statistics alone are sufficient to establish prima
facie case and cannot be negated by actual applicant statistics).
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THE GRE'YHOUND DECISION
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) brought an
action in the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, under
Section 706(f)(1), (3), (g), 31 and 70337 of Title VII, against Greyhound Lines,
Inc. ,38 challenging the legality of Greyhound's policy that prohibits the
wearing of beards by employees holding public contact jobs.3 9  The com-
plaint was filed on behalf of Jeffrey B. Ferguson, a twenty-seven year old
black male employee at Greyhound's Philadelphia terminal. Ferguson sought
promotion to the public contact job of ticket agent, but was denied the
36. Section 706(f)(1) & (3) provides in part:
(f)(1) If within thirty days after a charge is filed with the Commission or within
thirty days after expiration of any period of reference under subsection (c) or (d) of
this section, the Commission has been unable to secure from the respondent a
conciliation agreement acceptable to the Commission, the Commission may bring a
civil action against any respondent not a government, governmental agency, or
political subdivision named in the charge ....
(3) Each United States district court and each United States court of a place
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall have jurisdiction of actions
brought Linder this subchapter. Such an action may be brought in any judicial
district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have
been committed, in the judicial district in which the employment records relevant to
such practice are maintained and administered, or in the judicial district in which
the aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment
practice ....
Section 706(g) provides:
(g) If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is
intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the com-
plaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employ-
ment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may
include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without
back pay (payable by the employer, employment agency, or labor organization, as
the case may be, responsible for the unlawful employment practice), or any other
equitable relief as the court deems appropriate . . . .No order of the court shall
require the admission or reinstatement of an individual ...if such individual was
refused admission, suspended, or expelled, or was refused employment or advance-
ment or was suspended or discharged for any reason other than discrimination on
account of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin or in violation of section
2000e-3(a) of this title.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976 & Supp. I 1977) (originally
enacted as Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 706(f)(1), (3), 706(g), 78 Stat. 259 (1964)).
37. See note 10 supra.
38. EEOC v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 494 F. Supp. 481 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
39. Greyhound's policy directive PR-14 provides in part: "Beards, goatees, mutton chops or
other facial hair growths of an extreme or bizarre style are neither acceptable nor permissible
and are calculated to impair the neat and tidy personal appearance which is critically requisite
and, accordingly, may not be worn." Brief for Appellee at 7 n.6., EEOC v. Greyhound Lines,
Inc., 635 F.2d 188 (3d Cir. 1980).
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position and later "furloughed" because of his failure to comply with the "no
beard" requirement.40
Ferguson suffers from a skin condition known as pseudofolliculitis barbae
(PFB),4' which predominantly affects black males. 42  The EEOC alleged
that, under the Griggs disparate impact analysis, Greyhound's facially neu-
tral "no beard" policy has a racially discriminatory impact on blacks who
suffer from severe PFB. In short, due to the company's policy, black males
who are otherwise qualified are barred from higher paying positions solely
because of a condition peculiar to their race.
The district court agreed with the EEOC and held that the plaintiff had
established a prima facie case of discrimination. 43  Additionally, it ruled that
Greyhound had not met its burden of proving that the regulation was
justified by business necessity,4 4 and therefore the regulation was not suffi-
40. 494 F. Supp. at 482. The district court found that Ferguson "was qualified for the
position of ticket agent, except for his inability to conform to the grooming regulations." Id. at
484.
41. The district court explained in its findings of fact that this condition is caused by sharp
tips of recently shaved facial hairs penetrating the skin and causing an inflammatory reaction.
EEOC v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 494 F. Supp. 481, 483 (E.D. Pa. 1979). The disease occurs in
persons with curly or kinky hair follicles. After shaving, the curved hair follicles cause the
already curly hair to come back into contact with the skin surface, pierce and reenter the skin,
thus causing a pseudofollicle. Id. The court additionally found that the inflammatory reaction
may result in papules, pustules or abscesses. An individual with PFB may induce remission of the
disease by growing a beard, and remission in such cases is nearly total and complete. However,
an individual can redevelop the disease by resuming shaving. Id.
The court further found that Ferguson had a severe case of PFB and that growing a beard was
the only effective remedy because other treatments, such as depilatories, were unsuccessful and
even aggravated the condition. Id. Ferguson had been examined by three doctors, including
Greyhound's company doctor. All three doctors found that the severity of Ferguson's condition
indicated that it was medically necessary for him to refrain from shaving. Id. at 483 n.1.
42. The district court concluded that PFB is a disease that primarily affects black males.
EEOC v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 494 F. Supp. 481, 484 (E.D. Pa. 1979). The court also
accepted expert testimony presented by the EEOC showing that the incidence of PFB in black
males ranges from 45% to 83%, with approximately one-half of that number suffering from the
severe variety of PFB. Id. at 484 n.3. See note 66 infra. Accordingly, the court found that "PFB is
an immutable characteristic peculiar to members of the black race." Id. at 484.
43. Id. at 485.
44. Id. The district court applied the most often quoted standard for defining the business
necessity defense:
The test is whether there exists an overriding legitimate business purpose such that
the practice is necessary to the safe and efficient operation of the business. Thus, the
business purpose must be sufficiently compelling to override any racial impact; the
challenged practice must effectively carry out the business purpose it is alleged to
serve; and there must be available no acceptable or alternative policies or practices
which would better accomplish the business purpose advanced, or accomplish it
equally well with a lesser differential racial impact.
Robinson v. Lorillard, 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.) (footnotes omitted), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S.
1006 (plaintiff was Lorillard), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 107 (1971) (plaintiff was Tobacco
Workers Int'l Union).
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ciently compelling4 5 to justify its negative racial impact. 4  The court
granted judgment for the EEOC, awarded Ferguson back pay, and ordered
Greyhound to offer Ferguson employment as a ticket agent.4 7 Greyhound
appealed both findings of fact and conclusions of law to the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit.
EXAMINATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S DECISION
The sole issue the Third Circuit decided in Greyhound was whether the
plaintiff had met the required burden of proving that the defendant's facially
neutral policy had a disparate impact on black workers. 48  In deciding this
issue, the court examined two arguments posed by the EEOC.
The EEOC first asserted that clue to the overwhelmingly greater preva-
lence of PFB among blacks than among other racial groups, Greyhound's "no
beard" policy, and its refusal to grant medical exemptions thereto, dispro-
portionately excluded more blacks than whites from public contact posi-
tions.48  The court rejected this argument, 50 relying on statistical evidence
45. 494 F. Supp. at 485. Contra, Woods v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 420 F. Stpp. 35 (E.D. Va.
1976), aff'd, 579 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 930 (1979). In Woods, a case
which also concerned a plaintiff PFB victim and an employer's "no beard" requirement, the
district court held that defendant Safeway had met its burden, under the Robinsonl test, of
proving business necessity since Safeway was a retail food business and the product sold was
intended for consumption. Defendant's interest in "overall store hygiene and an appearance of
cleanliness," which would affect customer preference, overrode the disparate impact of the "no
beard" policy here. 420 F. Supp. at 43.
The district court in Greyhound compared the two industries and found that the regulation,
due to hygienic concerns, was far more reasonable in the retail food industry than the transporta-
tion industry. The court stated that "to the extent that this decision is inconsistent, with
deference, this Court declines to follow Woods' reasoning." 494 F. Supp. at 486.
46. 494 F. Supp. at 485.
47. Id. at 486.
48. EEOC v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 635 F.2d 188, 189 (3d Cir. 1980). Due to its finding
that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case, the court found it unnecessary to meet or
resolve the issues of the severity of Ferguson's disease and the business necessity defense. Id. at 190
nn. 1 & 2. The court also stated that it was assuming that a policy against beards could constitute
a violation of Title VII, but specifically declared that it was not meeting this issue either. Id. at
190 n.3.
49. Brief for Appellee at 13-14, EEOC v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 635 F.2d 188 (3d Cir.
1980).
50. The court relied in part upon the following language from Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975):
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), this Court unanimously held that
Title VII forbids the use of employment tests that are discriminatory in effect unless
the employer meets "the burden of showing that any given requirement [has] ...a
manifest relationship to the employment in question." Id. at 432. This burden arises,
of course, only after the complaining party has made out a prima facie case of
discrimination, i.e., has shown that the tests in question select applicants for hire or
promotion in a racial pattern significantly different from that of the pool of appli-
cants.
635 F.2d 188, 191 (3d Cir. 1980) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
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offered by the defendant which indicated that from 1974 through 1978, the
percentage of black male employees holding "no beard" public contact jobs
at the Philadelphia terminal had exceeded substantially the comparable
percentage of black males in both the labor force and general population in
the Philadelphia area. 5' The court also noted that the EEOC had offered no
evidence indicating that any other black males at defendant's Philadelphia
terminal desired to grow a beard due to PFB affliction.5 2
The EEOC also argued that a prima facie case of disparate impact may be
proved without a showing of statistical disparity in the actual number of
minority employees in the employer's work force. 53 In support of this con-
tention, the EEOC cited Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,54 in which
the Supreme Court held that regardless of the present proportional represen-
tation of a minority in an employer's work force, an equal employment
opportunity must still be given to each member of that racial minority. 55 The
51. 635 F.2d at 191-92 n.4. The population/work force statistics revealed that the percentage
of black males covered by the appearance code at Greyhound's Philadelphia terminal varied over
this time period from 20.5% on March 31, 1974 to 27.5% on December 31, 1977. This was
compared with figures of 14.3% black male representation in the total male labor force, and
15.5% black male representation in the total male population within the Philadelphia Standard
Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA). Brief for Appellant at 5-7 nn.2, 3 & 4, EEOC v. Grey-
hound Lines, Inc., 635 F.2d 188 (3d Cir. 1980).
52. 635 F.2d at 192. The EEOC contended that this evidence should not be required to
establish a prima facie case. The EEOC relied upon the following statement in Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977), as support for its position:
There is no requirement . . . that a statistical showing of disproportionate impact
must always be based on analysis of the characteristics of actual applicants . . . . The
application process itself might not adequately reflect the actual potential applicant
pool, since otherwise qualified people might be discouraged from applying because
of a self-recognized inability to meet the very standards challenged as being discrimi-
natory.
Id. at 330.
By analogy, the Commission reasoned that, as in Dothard, blacks with severe PFB will,
through self-selection, not seek promotion or transfer to public contact positions at Greyhound.
Therefore, statistics relating to the number of actual applicants for promotion with PFB would
not reflect the true impact of the "no beard" rule. Statistics relating to the incidence of PFB in
the general population, however, such as those offered by the Commission through its expert
witness at trial, would be highly probative of the impact upon potential applicants. See Brief for
Appellee at 19, EEOC v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 635 F.2d 188 (3d Cir. 1980).
The court admitted the validity of this theory. 635 F.2d at 192 n.5. The court rejected its
application in the instant case, however, claiming that the EEOC did not present general
population statistics to the district court. Therefore, the question of self-selection was not
relevant. Id.
53. The EEOC argued that Greyhound's policy "is not made lawful merely because Grey-
hound hires other blacks without PFB. It is the rate of exclusion which is the significant factor."
Brief for Appellee at 15-16, EEOC v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 635 F.2d 188 (3d Cir. 1980).
54. 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
55. The Furnco Court stated that "[i]t is clear beyond cavil that the obligation imposed by
Title VII is to provide an equal opportunity for each applicant regardless of race, without regard
to whether members of the applicant's race are already proportionately represented in the work
force." Id. at 579 (emphasis in original). Accord, City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702,
708-09 (1978) ("The statute's focus on the individual is unambiguous .... Even if the statutory
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Greyhound court distinguished Furnco, however, on the basis that it was a
disparate treatment case, and thus was inapplicable to cases in which it is
alleged that a facially neutral policy has had a disparate impact. 56  The
court then announced what it considered a "tautological" rule: "no violation
of Title VII can be grounded on the disparate impact theory without proof
that the questioned policy or practice has had a disproportionate impact on
the employer's work force." 57 In short, the court ruled that it would not
consider the alleged disparate impact of Greyhound's "no beard" policy in
the absence of a factual showing of discrimination or disparity in the actual
number of blacks hired.58
Finally, the court noted an additional ground for rejecting the EEOC's
case. In the court's view, a Title VII plaintiff must, under the disparate
impact analysis, "demonstrate a causal connection between the challenged
policy or regulation and a racially unequal result." 59  Thus, in Greyhound,
the EEOC did not show that the "no beard" policy had a greater impact on
blacks than whites, since it failed to establish that "there is no skin condition
or disease affecting white males-other than PFB-that makes shaving diffi-
cult or painful and requires them to grow beards. " Hence, the court
concluded that the EEOC proved only that Ferguson was disadvantaged
because he had PFB, not because he was black.6 '
CRITIQUE OF THE COURT'S OPINION
The Greyhound court misapprehended the purpose of Title VII and its
focus upon the individual, as well as the mechanics of the prima facie case
and methods of statistical proof available to a Title VII plaintiff. Addition-
ally, the court imposed previously unknown burdens upon plaintiffs in prov-
ing causation that severely restrict the effectiveness of disparate impact
analysis as an enforcement mechanism under Title VII.
language were less clear, the basic policy of the statute requires that we focus on fairness to
individuals rather than fairness to classes.").
56. 635 F.2d at 192.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 193. The Third Circuit in Greyhound thus aligns itself with the Second, Fourth
and Tenth Circuits in holding that proportionate representation of a minority in an employer's
work force will negate a finding of a discriminatory impact resulting from an employer's practice
or requirement on the minority. See note 35 supra and note 134 infra. The Greyhound majority
cited EEOC v. Navajo Refining Co., 593 F.2d 988 (10th Cir. 1979), as being in particular
agreement. Judge Sloviter, however, in her Greyhound dissent, felt that in light of the underly-
ing policies and the focus on the individual embodied in Title VII, as well as the Supreme Court's
statements in Furnco and Manhart, the preferable view was that followed by the District of
Columbia, Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits. 635 F.2d at 197-98 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
59. 635 F.2d at 193.
60. Id. at 194.
61. Id. The Greyhound dissent asserted, however, that there was no need for a Title VII
plaintiff to disprove comparable impact on whites from some other cause which would equalize
the disparate impact on the minority involved; this, the dissent argued, was unduly burdensome
and, additionally, had been required in no previous Title VII cases. 635 F.2d at 199-200
(Sloviter, J., dissenting).
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:945
General Population Statistics and the Prima Facie Case
In holding that the EEOC had produced no evidence establishing that the
"no beard" policy selects applicants for hire or promotion in a racial pattern
significantly different from that of the pool of applicants, 2 the Greyhound
court relied exclusively upon the defendant's favorably balanced population/
work force statistics,6 3 and the EEOC's lack of actual applicant statistics
showing that any other black males at the Philadelphia terminal sought to
grow beards because of PFB affliction.6 4 The court, however, totally disre-
garded the EEOC's general population statistics, which were presented
through expert medical testimony and accepted by the trial court. This
evidence demonstrated that PFB is an "immutable characteristic, limited
with rare exceptions, to members of the black race,"'6 5 and that "one-fourth
of all blacks who shave have a sufficiently severe case of PFB to be classified
at 'grade II'66 and encounter moderate to serious shaving difficulty."67 With-
out explanation, the court simply stated that the EEOC did not present
" 'general population statistics' to the district court."6" This bald statement
is difficult to reconcile because the "no beard" policy, when viewed in
conjunction with the EEOC's statistics, indicates that those blacks for whom
it is medically necessary to grow a beard due to severe PFB will suffer
significantly greater exclusion from public contact jobs than will whites, in
whom the incidence of the disease is minimal.6 9
62. 635 F.2d at 191.
63. See note 51 supra.
64. 635 F.2d at 192.
65. Brief for Appellee at 2-3, EEOC v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 635 F.2d 188 (3d Cir. 1980).
66. Plaintiff's expert witness, Dr. A. Melvin Alexander, developed a Zero to IV grade scale of
severity of PFB affliction. Grade II, "moderate shaving difficulty," is evidenced by the charac-
teristic ingrown hairs plus 20 or more papules (inflammations) at least 2 millimeters in diameter.
Abstinence from shaving is a recommended therapy at the Grade II level. Grade III, "'severe," is
characterized by multiple pustules and bumps with pus, and Grade IV, "very severe," evidences
painful, boil-like abscesses. Brief for Appellee at 5 n.4, EEOC v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 635
F.2d 188 (3d Cir. 1980).
67. Id. at 5.
68. 635 F.2d at 192 n.5. The apparent reason for this statement by the Greyhound court is
that the EEOC did not present additional evidence proving that no other skin condition or
disease exists among whites that would counterbalance the disparate impact of the "'no beard"
policy on those blacks suffering from PFB. See notes 109-23 and accompanving text infra.
69. See, e.g., Woods v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 35 (E.D. Va. 1976), aJJ'd, 579
F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 930 (1979). In Woods, plaintiff, a PFB sufferer,
sought to prove that Safeway's "no beard" rule had a disparate impact on black males. Signifi-
cantly, the district court there accepted plaintiff's expert witness testimony, nearly identical to
that presented in Greyhound, and concluded that a prima facie case had been established. The
court stated:
The evidence satisfies the Court that in its severe form, PFB is peculiar to blacks.
... The evidence adduced in the instant case does establish that the "no beard"
policy can act to disqualify an otherwise qualified black from employment solely on
the basis of a genetic characteristic peculiar to his race.
420 F. Supp. at 41-42. The court later held, however, that defendant had met its burden of
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Since the Supreme Court stated clearly in Dothard v. Rawlinson70 that
actual applicant statistics need not always be the basis of a showing of
disparate impact, 7' and the use of general population statistics was expressly
approved in both Griggs and Dothard,72 the Greyhound court's refusal to
accept the EEOC's data as prima facie evidence of discrimination clearly
contravenes established Supreme Court precedent.
Proportionate Representation of a Minority in the Employer's
Work Force and the Prima Facie Case
Even if the Greyhound court had accepted the EEOC's statistics relating
to the incidence of PFB in blacks, such statistics would not have been
sufficient to establish a prima facie disparate impact case under the court's
newly announced "tautological rule," thus shifting the burden to the em-
ployer to justify the policy.7 3 The court's reasoning that proportionate
representation of a minority in the employer's work force negates a finding of
the disparate impact of the employer's hiring or promotion requirement,' 4
effectively means that a policy that operates to exclude applicants as a result
of a race-linked characteristic 5 will not be deemed to have a disparate
proving business necessity because of the nature of the business and consequent hygienic consid-
erations. Id. at 43. See note 45 supra.
70. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
71. Id. at 330. In Dothard, the Supreme Court rejected the petitioner's argument that
generalized national statistics were insufficient to prove the disparate impact on women of
petitioner's height and weight requirements for State of Alabama prison guards. See note 52
supra. The requirements excluded 22-33% of all women in the United States between the ages of
18 and 79, but only 1-2% of men of similar ages.
One commentator has suggested that actual applicant statistics are merely a less accurate
variant of general population statistics that should be used when the employer's requirement at
issue is a written test or similar deyice and information concerning its effect on the general
population is unavailable. Conversely, when the requirement in question concerns physical
characteristics or educational qualifications of a racial group, general population statistics are
much more probative of the exclusionary effect on all potential applicants due to the much larger
sample involved. Shoben, supra note 3, at 8.
72. See note 29 supra.
73. The Greyhound court stated that -we need not consider the alleged disparate impact of
Greyhound's 'no beard' policy because there was no actual discrimination or disparity in its
hiring." 635 F.2d at 193.
74. Id. at 192-93.
75. Courts have generally upheld employer's reasonable grooming regulations where these
regulations affect only the personal preference of their employees. See, e.g., Baker v. California
Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1974) (hair length), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1046 (1975);
Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975) (hair length); Dodge v.
Giant Foods, 488 F.2d 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (hair length); Fagan v. National Cash Register
Co., 481 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (hair length). See also Katz, Personal Appearance Regula-
tions in Public Contact Jobs Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 1976 ARiz. ST. L.J. 1.
A distinction must be made, however, between violations of grooming regulations because of
personal preference, and inability to comply with the regulation because of immutable racially
or sexually-linked traits. One court has stated that: "[d]iscrimination based on either immutable
sex characteristics or constitutionally protected activities . . . violate[s] [Title VII] because they
present obstacles to employment of one sex that cannot be overcome. On the other hand,
19811
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impact on individuals of that race if the percentage of that racial minority in
the employer's work force equals the percentage of that minority in the
general population. 76  Thus, the Greyhound court, by focusing solely on the
racial balance of the employer's work force, has defeated the primary pur-
pose of Title VII, the "removal of artificial, arbitrary and unnecessary
barriers to employment" 77 and the protection of individuals, rather than
classes, in seeking equal employment opportunity. 78
As the Greyhound dissent noted, Title VII creates a right for an individual
not to be subjected to employment policies that disqualify members of pro-
tected groups at a disproportionate rate. 79  For those minority individuals
excluded by the impact of an employer's requirement, it is immaterial that
others of that minority have previously obtained an employment opportu-
nity.80 Thus, Title VII disparate impact analysis should focus upon the
impact of the challenged policy on individual minority members, not the
existing racial balance of the employer's work force.8 ' The underlying
rationale for the enactment of Title VII-an equal employment opportunity
for all regardless of race82-is contravened by the Third Circuit's proportion-
ate representation rule. The rule totally ignores the effect of the employer's
policy on those remaining individual minority group members who will be
adversely affected in their opportunity for employment or promotion. 83
discrimination based on personal preference does not necessarily restrict employment opportuni-
ties and thus is not forbidden." Earwood v. Continental Southeastern Lines, Inc., 539 F.2d
1349, 1351 (4th Cir. 1976). See also Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 269-70 (5th Cir. 1980)
(employer's requirement of not speaking Spanish while at work not violative of Title VII since
plaintiff employee was bilingual and chose to speak Spanish).
In Greyhound, the plaintiff proved in the district court, EEOC v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 494
F. Supp. 481-85 (E.D. Pa. 1979), and the court of appeals did not deny, that PFB is an
immutable, race-linked characteristic which "predominantly affects black males who shave."
EEOC v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 635 F.2d 188, 189 (3d Cir. 1980).
76. 635 F.2d at 196 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
77. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
78. See City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708-09 (1978). See also notes 10, 11 &
55 supra.
79. 635 F.2d at 197 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
80. Id.
81. One commentator, arguing that favorable population/work force figures should not
negate the disparate impact of an employment test or requirement under Title VII, stated that:
The reason is that the issue at stake is specifically the discriminatory impact of the
test, not the merits of the employer's racial record or efforts in general. This must
necessarily be so, because otherwise it would be impossible to relate the remedy to
the offense. The remedy asked for may be an injunction against the continued use of
the test, in which case the general behavior of the employer is obviously irrelevant,
since the test will continue to discriminate in spite of the employer's good intentions.
Or the remedy may be individual employment or promotion .... If this is to be the
remedy, then, of course, the remedy should not be denied this plaintiff because the
employer has, in relation to other people, maintained a racially balanced work
force.
3 LARSON, supra note 18, § 74.42.
82. See notes 9-11 supra.
83. 635 F.2d at 197 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
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The Supreme Court, acknowledging both the focus on the individual
evident from the statute's language and the legislative history, has consist-
ently emphasized that the purpose of Title VII is the protection of individ-
uals, not just classes. The Furnco Court specifically stated that an equal
employment opportunity must be given to each member of a minority group
regardless of the existence of proportionate representation of that minority in
an employer's work force."4 The Greyhound court's attempt to legitimize its
holding by distinguishing Furnco as a disparate treatment case, and there-
fore inapplicable,85 is feeble. An employer's basic obligation to refrain from
discriminating does not change because the discrimination results from a
facially neutral policy instead of from intentionally disparate treatment.8 6
The disparate treatment and disparate impact analyses are merely alterna-
tive methods of proving discrimination under Title VII. 7 A bifurcated
approach to the use of population/work force statistics has no basis in logic or
the holdings of any Supreme Court decision."'
Additionally, the Supreme Court has rejected the Greyhound proportion-
ate representation rule in a case which presented a similar factual situation.
In Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.," the defendant's policy of employing
men with preschool-age children, but rejecting applications from similarly
situated women, was challenged as discriminatory. 90 Although female rep-
resentation in the employer's work force was five to ten percent greater than
the percentage of female applicants, 9' the Court reversed the lower court
84. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579 (1978). See note 55 supra. Accord,
City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708-09 (1978).
85. 635 F.2d at 192.
86. Id. at 198 (Sloviter, J., dissenting). An indication that the Furnco Court did not intend to
restrict its holding that individuals must receive an equal employment opportunity regardless of
proportionate representation to disparate treatment cases lies in that the Court cites Griggs, the
primary disparate impact case, as authority for this proposition. Furnco Constr. Corp. v.
Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579 (1978).
87. 635 F.2d at 198 (Sloviter, J., dissenting). See also Wright v. National Archives & Records
Serv., 609 F.2d 702, 711 (4th Cir. 1979).
88. The Supreme Court in Furnco decisively rejected the contention that population/work
force figures can be a total defense to a disparate treatment prima facie case. The Court reasoned
that, under the disparate treatment analysis which requires a showing of intent, favorable
population/work force statistics are "not wholly irrelevant" when the issue of intent is yet to be
decided. 438 U.S. at 580. The Furnco Court stated that "[a]lthough . . . such proof neither was
nor could have been sufficient to conclusively demonstrate that Furnco's actions were not
discriminatorily motivated, the District Court was entitled to consider the racial mix of the work
force when trying to make the determination as to motivation." Id. (emphasis in the original).
In Greyhound, the EEOC did not contend that defendant adopted the "no beard" policy with
a purpose or intent to discriminate against blacks. 635 F.2d at 191. If, as the Supreme Court has
stated, favorable population/work force statistics are insufficient to deny a prima facie showing
of intentional discrimination, it follows that such statistics are insufficient to deny a prima facie
showing of invidious disparate impact or to obviate an employer's burden of justifying a
discriminatory policy. 235 F.2d at 198. (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
89. 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam).
90. Id. at 543.
91. Id.
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judgments and held that a prima facie case had been established under Title
VII.92 Significantly, the Court did not rely upon the high percentage of
females in the work force to negate discrimination, but merely found that
these figures tended to show an absence of "bias against women as such.."9 3
Similarly, in Greyhound, the Commission did not contend that the company
engaged in purposeful discrimination.9 4  If it had so contended, consider-
ation of the percentage of blacks in the work force would have been appro-
priate when determining intent.9 5 In disparate impact cases, however, there
is no intent requirement, thus work force percentages should not, as demon-
strated by Phillips, negate a prima facie case of discrimination.96
Thus, the Third Circuit's "tautological rule" is in conflict with both the
reasoning and holdings of the Supreme Court, as well as the underlying
rationale of Title VII. For these reasons, proportionate representation of a
minority in the employer's work force should not operate to negate a prima
facie disparate impact case. Although a split of authority exists in the various
circuit courts of appeal on this issue, the approach taken by the District of
Columbia, Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits, holding that proportionate
representation does not negate a finding of disparate impact,97 is preferable
to the rule adopted in Greyhound.
Causation and the Prima Facie Case
Additionally, the Greyhound court ruled that to establish a prima facie
disparate impact case a Title VII plaintiff must demonstrate a "causal con-
92. Id. at 544.
93. Id. at 543.
94. 635 F.2d at 191.
95. See note 88 and accompanying text supra. The Supreme Court in Furuco held that this
evidence was worthy of some consideration in determining intent tinder disparate treatment
analysis, but alone could not show conclusively that an employer's actions were not discriminato-
rily motivated. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 580 (1978).
96. See also Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973). In Espinoza, the petitioners,
Mexican aliens, argued that the respondent's policy against hiring noncitizens violated Title VII's
prohibition against discrimination on the basis of national origin. Although the Court relied on
population/work force statistics to show that discrimination against noncitizens generally had
not prevented persons of Mexican origin from obtaining employment at defendant's San Antonio
plant, the Court stressed that population/work force statistics are not an automatic "defense" to a
charge of discrimination under disparate impact analysis. The Court reasoned:
There is no indication in the record that Farah's policy against employment of aliens
had the purpose or effect of discriminating against persons of Mexican national
origin. It is conceded that Farah accepts employees of Mexican origin, provided the
individual concerned has become an American citizen. Indeed, the District Court
found that persons of Mexican ancestry make up more than 96% of the employees at
the company's San Antonio division .... While statistics such as these do not
automatically shield an employer from a charge of unlawful discrimination, the
plain fact of the matter is that Farah does not discriminate against persons of
Mexican national origin. . . . [Plaintiff] was denied employment, not because of the
country of her origin, but because she had not yet achieved United States citizenship.
Id. at 92-93 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
97. See note 35 and accompanying text supra and note 134 infra.
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nection between the challenged policy or regulation and a racially unequal
result.""" This is a judicial creation which is bereft of any supporting
authority. The reason for this lack of precedent is clear: although the rule is
apparently reasonable on its face, it imposes an almost insurmountable
burden of proof on the plaintiff. 99
Traditionally, a Title VII complainant carries a relatively light burden of
proof in establishing his or her prima facie case. A mere inference of discrim-
ination,1 ° or a showing that a policy denies members of a race equal access
to employment opportunities"'0 is sufficient. 102 The burden then shifts to the
defendant to justify the questioned practice.' 0 3 As the Greyhound dissent
pointed out, however, the court's new causation rule may be interpreted to
necessitate a showing that either the minority percentage in the employer's
work force would have been higher but for the discriminatory practice, or
that the particular plaintiff would have been hired but for the discriminatory
requirement. 04
In the former situation, a plaintiff could use only actual applicant statistics
as proof of causation, since only actual minority applicants could possibly
have increased the minority percentage in the employer's work force upon
being hired. This requirement of actual applicant statistics to prove causa-
tion, however, specifically contradicts the Supreme Court holding in
Dothard v. Rawlinson 0 5 that this type of statistic need not be used to
establish a prima facie case.0 9 Additionally, a shift in the traditional bur-
98. 635 F.2d at 193.
99. Id. at 198 (Sloviter, J., dissenting). Courts in general, and the Third Circuit in particu-
lar, have not placed such great burdens upon Title VII plaintiffs in proving a prima facie case of
discrimination. See, e.g., Jackson v. United States Steel Corp., 624 F.2d 436, 440-41 (3d Cir.
1980) ("the Third Circuit has not been overly demanding in the proof required for a primia facie
case.") (quoting Whack v. Peabody & Wind Eng'r Co., 595 F.2d 190, 193 n.ll (3d Cir. 1979)).
100. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 (1977)
(inference arises when plaintiff shows that his rejection did not result from lack of qualifications
or lack of job opening); Jackson v. United States Steel Corp., 624 F.2d 436, 440 (1980) (inference
arises when plaintiff offers sufficient evidence to show employer's action was based on impermis-
sible reasons).
101. See, e.g., New York Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 584 (1979) (statistical
evidence satisfactory to establish discriminatory effect of employer's policy).
102. The underlying rationale of Title VII and the economic interest in promoting equal
opportunity in employment would seem to preclude the imposition of great burdens on Title VII
plaintiffs in establishing a prima facie case. Additionally, employers have a variety of defenses at
their disposal to rebut the prima facie case, including the defenses of business necessity, job-
relatedness, and the bona fide occupational qualification. For a discussion of this last defense, see
1 LARSON, supra note 18, § 13.00. See also notes 44-45 supra.
103. See, e.g., Tuck v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (quoting
Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Serv., 520 F.2d 420, 425 (2d Cir. 1975)). The
Tuck court stated: "Proof in employment discrimination cases proceeds from effect to cause.
Plaintiffs establish the racially [or other impermissibly] disparate consequences of defendants'
employment practices, and defendants must then justify such consequences .... " 421 F. Supp.
at 44.
104. 635 F.2d at 199 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
105. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
106. Id. at 330. See note 52 supra.
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dens of proof will occur. An employer's defense that a low percentage of
minorities in the work force is due to an insufficient number of minority
applicants will become a requirement that a plaintiff prove in his or her
prima facie case that there are actual minority applicants who were disquali-
fied. 0 7 The latter alternative of requiring a Title VII plaintiff to prove that
he or she would have been hired but for the challenged policy also poses an
unreasonable burden, and has not previously been required in Title VII
litigation. 108
Applying this causation rule, the Third Circuit held that the EEOC had
failed in its prima facie proof because evidence was not introduced proving
that no skin condition or disease, other than PFB, affects white males with
comparable incidence and severity to prevent them from shaving and conse-
quently obeying the "no beard" directive."'0 The Supreme Court, however,
ruled in Dothard that a Title VII plaintiff need not exhaust every possible
source of evidence if the proof offered demonstrates an employment require-
ment's discriminatory impact." 0 For this reason alone, plaintiff's trial evi-
dence, demonstrating the high incidence and severity of PFB in blacks, the
resulting inability to shave, and the nearly total absence of PFB in whites,'
was sufficient to demonstrate causation.
The Greyhound court also mischaracterized the cause of Ferguson's inabil-
ity to comply with the challenged policy. It is true, as the court pointed
out," 2 that the impact of a requirement on the majority race must be
107. 635 F.2d at 199 (Sloviter, J., dissenting). The court's causation requirement, together
with the necessity of showing disparate impact in numbers in the employer's work force, means
that to prove a prima facie case: 1) population/work force statistics are required to prove
disparate impact in numbers on the work force, and 2) actual applicant pass/fail statistics are
required to prove causation between the challenged policy and the unequal result in the work
force as shown by the population/work force statistics. This enormous burden conflicts with
Griggs original statement, and the Dothard reaffirmance, that general population pass/fail
statistics are sufficient to prove a prima facie case of disparate impact. See Dothard v. Rawlin-
son, 433 U.S. 321, 330 (1977); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 n.6 (1971).
108. 635 F.2d at 198 (Sloviter, J., dissenting). The Greyhound dissent pointed out that in
disparate treatment cases one need only show the four factors outlined in McDonnell to prove a
prima facie case. Id. citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1975). See
note 12 supra. The Supreme Court has indicated that McDonnell is neither an inflexible
formulation, nor the only means of proving a prima facie case, since the facts will vary in each
situation. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 (1977). Nonethe-
less, the Court has never imposed a stricter causation requirement for disparate treatment cases
than that found in McDonnell. Thus, there would appear to be no reason to do so in disparate
impact cases since disparate impact and treatment are but alternative methods of proving
discrimination. See Wright v. National Archives & Records Serv., 609 F.2d 702, 711 (4th Cir.
1979).
109. 635 F.2d at 194.
110. The Court stated that "[t]he plaintiffs ...are not required to exhaust every possible
source of evidence, if the evidence actually presented on its face conspicuously demonstrates a
job requirement's grossly discriminatory impact." Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331
(1977).
111. See notes 41-42, 66-68, and accompanying text supra.
112. 635 F.2d at 194.
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compared with its impact on the minority alleging discrimination." 3  Here,
the requirement is the "no beard" rule. The impact of this requirement
arises, however, not merely because PFB is a disease, but because PFB is an
immutable, race-linked disease affecting black males."' Thus, the EEOC
did not prove merely that Ferguson was disadvantaged because he had PFB,
as the court contended," 5 but it showed that he was disadvantaged precisely
because he was black. Thus, the statistical evidence indicated that for all
practical purposes, "PFB" equaled "black.""'
Consequently, for other skin diseases to offset the disparate impact of the
"no beard" rule on blacks with PFB, it would be necessary for these hypo-
thetical diseases to be linked specifically to race as an immutable racial
characteristic of whites. Although Title VII protects victims of racial dis-
crimination, rather than disease discrimination," 7 it would be the defend-
ant's burden, according to Dothard, to prove a similar incidence and severity
in whites to avoid a finding of discrimination.1 8  Thus, an employer should
be required to adduce statistics demonstrating the comparable impact of the
hypothetical disease on whites that equalizes the impact of the "no beard"
rule on the protected class. 119
No previous Title VII cases, however, including those concerning immuta-
ble racial characteristics, 20 have required a plaintiff to "disprove the exis-
113. See also Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329-30 (1977); Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424, 430 n.6 (1971); Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 523 F.2d 1290, 1295 (8th Cir. 1975);
Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364, 1372 n.22 (5th Cir. 1974).
114. See note 75 supra.
115. 635 F.2d at 194.
116. See notes 41-42, 66-68, and accompanying text supra.
117. It would be necessary that the effects of this hypothetical disease be comparable to PFB's
effects on blacks; 45% to 83% of white males would have to be affected, and 25% of whites
must suffer from it severely enough to preclude shaving. Appellant's Petition for Rehearing at 11,
EEOC v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 635 F.2d 188 (3d Cir. 1980).
118. As the Dothard Court stated, "If the employer discerns fallacies or deficiencies in the
data offered by the plaintiff, he is free to adduce countervailing evidence of his own." Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331 (1977). Greyhound introduced no evidence suggesting that hypo-
thetical skin diseases comparable to PFB and affecting white males actually exist. Appellant's
Petition for Rehearing at 12, EEOC v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 635 F.2d 188 (3d Cir. 1980).
119. When immutable, race-linked characteristics are at issue, the preferable view would be
to grant a medical exemption from the requirement to members of the afflicted race. Engaging
in a "comparative impact" analysis is improper when immutable racial characteristics are
concerned since Title VII has been construed to protect all races. See, e.g., McDonald v. Santa
Fe Trail Transp., 427 U.S. 273, 280 (1976); Hicks v. ABT Assoc., Inc., 572 F.2d 960, 967 (3d
Cir. 1978); Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. Young, 446 F. Supp. 979, 1003 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
Further, it is erroneous to argue that one race's comparably severe disease nullifies the other's
impact, thus removing the question from the ambit of Title VII protection. This would be so
only if the diseases were not linked to race; indeed, if race were not involved, Title VII would be
totally inapplicable. When each condition is race-linked, however, Title VII's focus upon the
individual indicates that protection should be afforded to members of both races afflicted by
their respective race-linked diseases.
120. See, e.g., Woods v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 35 (E.D. Va. 1976), aff'd, 579
F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 930 (1979); Smith v. Olin Chem. Corp., 555 F.2d
1283 (5th Cir. 1977). In Woods, plaintiff, a PFB sufferer, contended that defendant's "no beard"
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tence of a comparable impact on whites from some other cause which might
equalize the adverse impact on the protected class."" '' The Greyhound
court's demand for this proof is based on an overly rigid approach to causa-
tion that severely conflicts with the settled practice in Title VII litigation of
not imposing overly demanding proof requirements to establish a prima facie
case.12 2 Thus, the EEOC's proof that PFB predominantly affects blacks was
sufficient to create an inference that the "no beard" policy predominantly
affects blacks. 123 The additional showing required by the Third Circuit only
presents a needless obstacle to plaintiffs in establishing their prima facie case
in a Title VII action.
IMPACT OF THE COURT'S DECISION
The Greyhound decision will greatly hinder disparate impact litigation as
a method of effectuating Title VII's goal of equal employment opportunity
for all regardless of race. Contrary to Title VII policy, the Third Circuit's
new rules significantly increase the burden of proof required to establish a
prima facie case under this analysis.124 Further, the Third Circuit's propor-
tionate representation rule reduces the number of statistical methods avail-
able to prove a prima facie case in Title VII litigation. Contrary to Griggs
and Dothard,125 only population/work force statistics may now be used to
rule had disparate impact on blacks. The court agreed that a prima facie case had been shown
through plaintiff's general population statistics, but ruled that defendant had proved business
necessity, thus justifying the discriminatory effect of the rule. 420 F. Supp. at 41-43. However,
no causation rule reqtuiring plaintiff to first disprove comparable impact on whites from some
other source was imposed by the court. See note 45 supra. In Smith, the court examined a black's
claim that his discharge from employment as a laborer was discriminatory. A physical examina-
tion had revealed bone degeneration in his back, which he claimed was due to sickle cell anemia.
The court demanded no proof that whites do not suffer from other similar diseases tbat lead to a
defective back condition, but merely held that for a laborer, a good back was so manifestly job-
related that business necessity could be presumed. 555 F.2d at 1288.
121. 635 F.2d at 199-200 (Sloviter, J., dissenting) (emphasis in the original). See, e.g.,
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 (1977) ("[AJny Title VII
plaintiff must carry the initial burden of offering evidence adequate to create an inference that
an employment decision was based on a discriminatory criterion illegal tinder the Act.").
122. See notes 99-102 and accompanying text supra.
123. As the EEOC argued:
[A] showing that 25% of blacks failed an employment test would not be sufficient to
establish that the test had a disparate impact without evidence as to the failure rate
among whites. This is so, however, because there is a real possibility that 25% of
whites may have failed a given test. To mechanically impose the same proof require-
ment on the Commission in this case where the possibility of comparable disqualifi-
cation rates among whites is virtually nonexistent serves no useful purpose . . . . [A]
plaintiff need not disprove every logical possibility which would explain its statistics
in non-discriminatory terms, as long as the plaintiff has convincingly demonstrated a
significant disparity.
Appellant's Petition for Rehearing at 13, EEOC v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 635 F.2d 188 (3d Cir.
1980).
124. See notes 99-102 and accompanying text supra.
125. See notes 29 & 52 and accompanying text supra.
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establish a prima facie case under the disparate impact theory and, conse-
quently, population/work force statistics may now nullify a showing of
disparate impact made through the use of general population or actual
applicant statistics.126 By utilizing a statistical method formerly used only in
establishing a prima facie case as a method of rebutting one, an invidious
quota defense arises for an employer. The percentage of a given minority in
the general population will now be the ultimate limit to which an employer
is required to extend employment opportunities. 1
27
The Greyhound causation rule also restricts the statistical methods avail-
able to Title VII plaintiffs by necessitating the use of actual applicant statis-
tics to prove a connection between the challenged policy and the requisite
unequal result in the work force. 128 Thus, the Third Circuit contradicted
the Supreme Court's statements in Griggs and Dothard that general popula-
tion statistics alone are sufficient, and actual applicant or population/work
force statistics need not be shown.129 Additionally, the causation rule brings
about an enormous shift in the burdens of proof previously recognized under
Title VII. A plaintiff must now prove that but for the challenged policy, the
minority work force population would have been greater. Thus, the Grey-
hound rule converts an employer's defense of insufficient numbers of minor-
ity applicants into an additional burden on the plaintiff to prove the propor-
tion and number of actual minority applicants that were rejected. 130  This
new requirement, when combined with the court's additional demand that a
plaintiff disprove the existence of comparable impact upon whites from all
other causes that might somehow equalize the impact of the policy on the
minority,' 3 ' creates an insurmountable burden of proof never yet imposed
upon plaintiffs in Title VII disparate impact litigation. 32  The practical
effect of this enormous burden will be to reduce the initiation of disparate
126. 635 F.2d at 193. See also notes 73 & 107 supra.
127. 635 F.2d at 196-97 (Sloviter, J., dissenting). Title VII does not require a work force to be
racially balanced as long as any imbalance is not due to discriminatory employment practices.
See Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1012 n.6 (1st Cir. 1979) (employer not required to
adopt policies to maximize the number of minorities in his work force); Latin Am. Citizens v.
City of Santa Ana, 410 F. Supp. 873, 891, modified in part, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1019
(C.D. Cal. 1976) (employer not required to hire minorities in proportion to their representation
in the population); Western Addition Community Org. v. Alioto, 360 F. Supp. 733, 739 (N.D.
Cal. 1973) (same). However, no authority exists for the proposition that an employer need not
offer employment to blacks because of an already racially balanced work force. See, e.g., Furneo
Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579 (1978); Vaughn v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 471 F.
Supp. 281, 285 (E.D. Ark. 1979). The Vaughn court stated that: "[P]erhaps the employer
believes that harmony in its work force can best be preserved by not allowing the number of
black employees to exceed by much their proportion in the general population .... This
motivation is forbidden by law."
128. See note 107 and accompanying text supra.
129. See notes 29 & 52 and accompanying text supra.
130. See note 118 and accompanying text supra.
131. 635 F.2d at 194.
132. See notes 99-102 and accompanying text supra.
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impact litigation due to the difficulty of proving the prima facie case.
Consequently, Title VII's goal of equal employment opportunity for all
individuals regardless of race will be severely frustrated.133
CONCLUSION
By limiting the methods of statistical proof available to plaintiffs, and
imposing previously unnecessary causation elements upon them in proving a
prima facie case based on the disparate impact theory, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has drastically reduced the effective-
ness of this analysis as a method of enforcement under Title VII. The court
has effectively closed the doors to minority individuals who seek an equal
employment opportunity merely because other members of that minority
have already passed through those doors. While paying "lip service" to the
spirit of Title VII and to the clear indications of the Supreme Court in
Furnco, the court has created a precedent with disturbing implications. The
"quota defense," in conjunction with the unwarranted causational obstacles
hereby established, will impede further progress in achieving the societal
goal of equality of employment opportunity. Since the approaches taken by
the several circuit courts of appeals in deciding the questions presented in
Greyhound differ significantly, and the answers to them are of such potential
importance for so many minority individuals, ultimate resolution by the
United States Supreme Court is desirable and, indeed, urgently needed. 3 4
Roger Carl Glienke
133. See notes 9-11 and accompanying text supra.
134. As this Note went to press, it appeared that the Supreme Court would soon be deciding
the issue of whether proportionate representation of a minority in an employer's work force
negates a finding of the disparate impact of an employer's hiring or promotion requirement on
that minority.
In Teal v. Connecticut, 645 F.2d 133 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 102 S.Ct. 89 (1981), four black
state employees brought suit under Title VII alleging that a written examination, on which a
passing score was a prerequisite to further consideration in the state's promotion process, had a
disparate impact on members of their race. The passing rate on the examination for black
candidates was approximately 68% that of the passing rate for white candidates. Id. at 136. The
actual promotion rate of blacks, however, was 170% that of the actual promotion rate of whites.
This was due in part to an affirmative action program used by the state in its promotion
program. The trial court concluded that the results of the entire selection process, which
included other factors such as past work performance, recommendations by supervisors, and
seniority, was the proper basis for determining whether a prima facie case had been proved.
Accordingly, the trial court dismissed the plaintiff's action for failure to prove a prima facie case
because the results of the entire selection procedure were actually more favorable to black
candidates than white candidates. Id. at 137.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the trial court's decision. The appellate
court ruled that "where a plaintiff establishes that a component of a selection process produced
disparate results and constituted a pass-fail barrier beyond which the complaining candidates
were not permitted to proceed, a prima facie case of disparate impact is established, notwith-
standing that the entire selection procedure did not yield disparate results." Id. at 135. The court
further stated that "Title VII cannot be interpreted to permit obvious denial of employment
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opportunities to candidates that is solely attributable to non-job-related characteristics they
possess that are incident to their race." Id. at 135.
Thus, the Second Circuit implicitly overrules its decision in Townsend v. Nassau County
Medical Center, 558 F.2d 177 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1015 (1978), and aligns itself
with those circuits which hold that a prima facie case of disparate impact may be proved without
a statistical showing of underrepresentation of a minority in hiring or promotion in an employer's
work force. See note 35 supra. Since this view comports with the focus upon the individual found
in both Title VII and the Supreme Court's holdings in Furnco and Manhart, the Supreme Court
should affirm the judgment of the Second Circuit and bring final resolution to this question.

